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The author examines controversial verses depicting trial scene in a homicide 
case on the shield of Achilles in Iliad. The author firstly points to few unclear 
issues: a) what was core of the case – a question of facts (whether the blood-money 
for a homicide - poinē has been paid or not) or it was a legal question (could a 
blood-feud be replaced with a recompensation)?; b) did the litigants voluntarily 
present their dispute for settlement by the arbiter to avoid self-help (arbitration 
theory) or the issue was a part of the public control of self-help?; c) who decides 
the case (gathered people, collective of elders – gerontes or an individual – istor) 
and to whom goes deposited amount of 12 tallents of gold? The main focus of this 
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article is concentrated upon istor, who is defined as an arbiter or a judge in the 
existing literature. The author offers an innovative approach that the istor was 
neither a judge nor an arbiter but a person of public faith, and compares it with 
the mnāmōn in the Code of Gortyn in 5th century Crete (one who knows, one 
who remembers). he also invokes legal anthropology to suggest parallels with the 
medieval institution of pristav, who kept a memory of court rulings, helped judges 
in Slavic medieval law, and was a kind of guarantee of different legal acts. The 
last anthropological parallel comes from customary institution among Albanians 
at Kosovo and metohia, namely the court of elders (plechnija) and institution of 
dorzon who was a guarantee that the opinion of the plechnar will be respected. 
The final conclusion is that istor was a person of public faith and a guarantor 
in blood-money case, one who was present and who knows important facts about 
the blood-feud agreement.
Key words: homicide, blood-feud, self-help, arbitration, Code of Gortyn
The description of the famous homicide trial depicted on the shield of 
Achilles in Iliad is one of the most controversial and disputed issues in Home-
ric law. It is challenging both in terms of translation, as well as in legal expla-
nation and significance of the case. 
At first, let us have a look at a number of English translations to perceive 
different linguistic approaches and explanations caused by the problematic 
diction of Homer.1 Variety of translations of the word istor is very significant, 
causing many important consequences in understanding the istor’s role and 
perception of the whole text and scene.
1. HOMER, Iliad XVIII, 497-508 – TEXT AND TRANSLATIONS
λαοὶ δ᾽ εἰν ἀγορῇ ἔσαν ἀθρόοι: ἔνθα δὲ νεῖκος 
ὠρώρει, δύο δ᾽ ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς 
ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου: ὃ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ᾽ ἀποδοῦναι 
δήμῳ πιφαύσκων, ὃ δ᾽ ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι:  500 
ἄμφω δ᾽ ἱέσθην ἐπὶ ἴστορι πεῖραρ ἑλέσθαι. 
λαοὶ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί: 
1 I am particularly grateful to Prof. Victor Castellani (University of Denver, Chair of 
the Department of Languages and Literatures), for offering me most relevant En-
glish translations of the Iliad and for many valuable discussions and suggestions. 
Translations in other languages take a similar approach in translating word istor, 
but some of them offer a bit more flexible linguistic solutions. However this paper 
is limited mostly to English translations.
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κήρυκες δ᾽ ἄρα λαὸν ἐρήτυον: οἳ δὲ γέροντες 
εἵατ᾽ ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ, 
σκῆπτρα δὲ κηρύκων ἐν χέρσ᾽ ἔχον ἠεροφώνων:  505 
τοῖσιν ἔπειτ᾽ ἤϊσσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον. 
κεῖτο δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐν μέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα, 
τῷ δόμεν ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι.
W. H. D. Rouse (1938)2:
A crowd was in the market-place, where a dispute was going on.  Two men 
disputed over the blood-price of a man who had been killed: one said he had 
offered all, and told his tale before the people, the other refused to accept 
anything; but both were willing to appeal to an umpire for the decision. The 
crowd cheered one or the other as they took sides, and the heralds kept them 
in order. The elders sat at the Sacred Circle on the polished stones, and each 
took the herald’s staff as they rose in turn to give judgment. Before them lay 
two nuggets of gold, for the one who should give fairest judgment.
E. V. Rieu (1950)3:
But the men had flocked to the meeting-place, where a case had come up 
between two litigants, about the payment of compensation for a man who had 
been killed. The defendant claimed the right to pay in full and was announcing 
his intention to the people; but the other contested his claim and refused all 
compensation. Both parties insisted that the issue should be settled by a referee; 
and both were cheered by their supporters in the crowd, whom the heralds 
were attempting to silence. The Elders sat on the sacred bench, a semicircle of 
polished stone; and each, as he received the speaker’s rod from the clear-voiced 
heralds, came forward in his turn to give his judgment staff in hand. Two ta-
lents of gold were displayed in the centre: they were the fee for the Elder whose 
exposition of the law should prove the best.
Richmond Lattimore (1951)4:
The people were assembled in the market place, where a quarrel
had arisen, and two men were disputing over the blood price
2 W. H. D. Rouse, The Iliad, Cambridge 1938.
3 E. V. Rieu, The Iliad, By homer, Middlesex 1950.
4 R. Lattimore, The Iliad of homer, Chicago 1951.
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for a man who had been killed. One man promised full restitution
in a public statement, but the other refused and would accept nothing.
Both then made for an arbitrator, to have a decision;
and people were speaking up on either side, to help both men.
But the heralds kept the people in hand, as meanwhile the elders
were in session on benches of polished stone in the sacred circle
and held in their hands the staves of the heralds who lift their voices.
The two men rushed before these, and took turns speaking their cases,
and between them lay on the ground two talents of gold, to be given
to that judge who in this case spoke the straightest opinion.
Robert Fitzgerald (1974)5: 
A crowd, then, in a market place, and there
two men at odds over satisfaction owed
for a murder done: one claimed that all was paid,
and publicly declared it; his opponent
turned the reparation down, and both 
demanded a verdict from an arbiter,
as people clamored in support of each,
and criers restrained the crowd. The town elders
sat in a ring, on chairs of polished stone, 
the staves of clarion criers in their hands, 
with which they sprang up, each to speak in turn,
and in the middle were two golden measures
to be awarded him whose argument
would be most straightforward.
Martin Hammond (1987)6:
The men had gathered in the market-place, where a quarrel was in progress, 
two men quarrelling over the blood-money for a man who had been killed: 
one claimed that we was making full compensation, and was showing it to the 
people, but the other refused to accept any payment: both were eager to take 
a decision from an arbitrator. The people were taking sides, and shouting their 
5 R. Fitzgerald, homer, The Iliad, New York 1974.
6 M. Hammond, homer: The Iliad. A New Prose Translation, London 1987.
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support for either man, while the heralds tried to keep them in check. And 
the elders sat on the polished stone seats in the sacred circle, taking the rod in 
their hands as they received it from the loud-voiced heralds: then each would 
stand forward with the rod, and give his judgment in turn. And two talents of 
gold lay on the ground in the middle of their circle, to be given to the one who 
spoke the straightest judgment.
Robert Fagles (1990)7:
And the people massed, streaming into the marketplace
where a quarrel had broken out and two men struggled
over the blood-price for a kinsman just murdered.
One declaimed in public, vowing payment in full—
the other spurned him, he would not take a thing—
so both men pressed for a judge to cut the knot.
The crowd cheered on both, they took both sides,
but heralds held them back as the city elders sat
on polished stone benches, forming the sacred circle,
grasping in hand the staffs of clear-voiced heralds
and each leapt to his feet to plead the case in turn.
Two bars of solid gold shone on the ground before them,
a prize for the judge who’d speak the straightest verdict.
Michael Reck (1994)8:
And a crowd had gathered where a quarrel
had arisen about the proper fine
for a murder: one man offered to pay,
another declined to accept the sum,
and both had requested arbitration.
The crowd stood cheering for their favorites
as heralds held them back, and the elders
sat on smooth stones in the sacred circle,
and each one held the herald’s staff in turn
7 R. Fagles, The Iliad, New York 1990.
8 M. Reck, homer: The Iliad, New York 1994.
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when he sprang up to announce his verdict.
and in the middle lay two gold pieces
for the one whose judgment was accepted.
Stanley Lombardo (1997)9:
There was a crowd in the market-place
And a quarrel arising between two men
Over blood money for a murder,
One claiming the right to make restitution,
The other refusing to accept any terms.
They were heading for an arbitrator
And the people were shouting, taking sides,
But heralds restrained them. The elders sat
On polished stone seats in the sacred circle
And held in their hands the staves of heralds.
The pair rushed up and pleaded their cases, 
and between them lay two ingots of gold
For whoever spoke straightest in judgment.
Anthony Verity (2011)10:
In the meeting-place a crowd of citizens had formed;
a dispute had arisen there, and two men were quarreling
over the blood-money of a man who had been killed.
One claimed he had paid it in full, appealing to the people,
while the other said he had received nothing; both were anxious
to go to an arbitrator for judgement. The people took sides,
shouting support for both; heralds were holding them back,
while the elders sat on polished stones in a sacred circle,
holding in their hands the loud-voiced heralds’ staffs.
The disputants rushed up to these men, and they gave their judgements
In turn; two talents of gold lay before them, to be given to
9 S. Lombardo, homer Iliad, Indianapolis 2011.
10 A. Verity, The Iliad, Oxford 2011.
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The judge who should deliver to them the straightest verdict.
Stephen Mitchell (2011)11:
At the place of assembly, meanwhile, a crowd had gathered.
A quarrel had broken out, and two men were disputing
About the blood-price for someone who had been killed.
One man was claiming the right to pay for the death,
While the other refused to accept any compensation,
And each was eager to plead his case to the judges.
The people were cheering them on, some taking the side
Of one, some taking the other’s side, while the heralds
Tried to control the crowd, and the city elders
Were seated on polished stone chairs in the sacred circle,
Holding the heralds’ staffs. The men stood before them,
And each made his case, and the elders rose and gave judgments.
Two bars of solid gold, one from each side, 
Were displayed in the center; they were to be awarded
To the judge who was thought to give the clearest opinion.
The adequacy and accuracy of the translated verses of the Homeric poem is 
very disputable and it exceeds general concern about exactness in translating 
ancient Greek legal texts. The old Italian male chauvinistic aphorism about 
translations and woman fits quite well to this situation: “Le traduzioni sono 
come le donne. Quando sono belle non sono fedeli, e quando sono fedeli non 
sono belle” (Carl Bertrand). But in Il. 18, 497-508 the attractiveness of trans-
lation, it is not at stake. It is about something much more important – about 
its content. Translating legal terminology is particularly delicate as it depends 
on different legal cultures, distinctive terminology, specific legal concepts, di-
verse backgrounds, etc. And in the Homeric environment, which is not so well 
known to a modern reader in general, explaining exact meaning of some terms 
looks like a mission impossible at times. It refers particularly to the notion of 
the istor, as it is not only a linguistic issue but much more a matter of how to 
understand the essence of a legal institution.
11 S. Mitchell, The Iliad, New York 2011.
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Ending the overview of some usual English translations by philologists who 
act sometimes like poets, let us see the offers by two prestigious English spe-
aking scholars well acquainted with Greek history, culture and law. The first 
one is N.G.L. Hammond, the author of the famous A History of Greece to 322 
B.C.,	who	suggests	following:
“Men-at-arms were gathered together in assembly. There a quarrel had ari-
sen between two men over retribution for the killing of a man. One promised 
to give full compensation, making his declaration in public; the other refused 
to accept anything. Both were eager to obtain a conclusion at the hands of one-
who-knows. Men-at-arms were speaking urgently in favor of each, supporting 
either side, and the folk were being held back by the heralds. And the elders 
were seated on polished stones in a sacred circle and they were taking hold of 
maces from the clear-voiced heralds. Then with the maces they were starting 
up and giving judgment each in turn. In the midst of them were set two talents 
of gold, to be presented to whoever among them should express his judgment 
in the straightest manner.”12
The second distinguished scholar, basically a historian, but also one of 
the most knowledgeable modern authorities on ancient Greek law, Douglas 
MacDowell, offers translation of the trial scene as follows:
“In the assembly place were people gathered. There a dispute had arisen: 
two men were disputing about the recompense (poinē) for a dead man. The one 
was claiming to have paid it in full, making his statement to the people, but 
the other was refusing to receive anything; both wished to obtain trial at the hands 
of a judge. The people were cheering them both on, supporting both sides; and 
heralds quieted the people. The elders sat on polished stones in a sacred circle, 
and held in their hands sceptres from the loud-voiced heralds; with these they 
were then hurrying forward and giving their judgments in turn. And in the 
middle lay two talents of gold, to give to the one who delivered judgment most 
rightly among them” (18.497-508).13 
However, MacDowell discloses that lines 18.499-500 could be turned into: 
“the one was claiming to have paid it in full ..., but the other was denying that 
12 N. Hammond, “The Scene in Iliad 18, 497-508 and the Albanian Blood-Feud”, 
Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 22 (1985), 81. Hammond believes that 
“one-who-knows” is the elder whom the parties choose who convenes the assembly, 
85, fn. 24.
13 D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, London 1978, 19. 
Zbornik PFZ, 67, (5) 723-756 (2017) 731
he had received anything”.14 It is clear that those two possible translations (inter-
pretations, understandings) of the legal issue and essence of the dispute, can 
affect explanation of the role of istor. It means that many options could be 
under consideration. 
2. RELATED ISSUES
The whole scene is very curious, it presents a wide variety of questions and 
it has generated diverse readings and hypotheses on many issues, apart from 
the query who the istor was and what was his role. All these problems are inter-
connected in some aspects.
2.1. The first great, chronic controversy was mentioned by MacDowell in 
the passage quoted above. What was core of the case? Was it a question of 
facts: whether the blood-money for a homicide (poinē) has been paid or not? 
Or it was a legal question – whether the blood-money is acceptable or not? Is 
it tolerable that a killer can pay a fine (ransom) for his act or not? Could a 
blood-feud be replaced with a recompensation? 
The issue was opened many decades ago, but it is not yet closed. After 
a long relative accord that the scene is about accomplishment of a certain 
blood-price, Sidgwick wrote in 1894: “But during the last twelve years there 
has been a tendency to prefer an interpretation historically more impressive, 
according to which the dispute is not about a mere payment of money, but on 
the question whether a blood-feud shall be extinguished by the acceptance of 
a composition”.15 The battlefield is still open.
Curiously the older, traditional approach (issue of fact) was supported 
mostly by lawyers or those whose main field of expertise was ancient Greek 
law.16 The second opinion (issue of law) was mainly favored by linguists and 
14 Ibid.
15 H. Sidgwick, “The Trial Scene in Homer”, The Classical review 8, 1-2 (1894), 1 – 3.
16 Just to mention some of them following Westbrook’s selection: G. M. Calhoun, The 
Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece, Berkeley 1927, 18; R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, 
The Administration of Justice from homer to Aristotle, I, Chicago 1930, 31 – 35; H. 
Hommel, “Die Gerichtsszene auf dem Schild des Achilleus. Zur Pflege des Rechts 
in homerischer Zeit”, in: Palingenesia IV, Wiesbaden 1969, 16; A. Primmer, “Ho-
merische Gerichtsszenen”, Wiener Studien 4 (1970), 11 – 13; E. Cantarella, Studi 
sull’ omicidio in diritto greco e romano, Milan 1976, 73 – 74. G. Thür, “Zum dikazein 
bei Homer”, Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung 87 (1970), 426 – 444 is resolute that the 
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historians (of course, with considerable exceptions).17 Supporting that view, 
Leaf asked why should such a big social theatre be arranged if the issue is 
only whether the sum of money has been paid or not? However, the theory 
of legal issue appeared to have been more complicated, as new questions and 
possible options inevitably arose out of it. In Michael Gagarin’s words the 
disagreement is between the relatives of the victim who can not agree about 
acceptance of the compensation.18 Gagarin also points that the amount in that 
case must have been so high that such a payment would probably have been 
made in front of witnesses. A similar point was accurately raised before him 
by Köstler.19 Many other particular, additional issues in this affair remained 
undecided.
2.2. A closely related dilemma is whether the litigants have voluntarily pre-
sented their dispute for settlement in front of the arbiter to avoid self-help? 
Gagarin is one of the most famous contemporary followers of the older, qu-
ite popular “Schiedsgerichtstheorie” (arbitration theory).20 According to his 
explanation the basileus or the group of elders offered conciliation through the 
middle solution acceptable for both parties. In that way the traditional arbitra-
tion theory was enhanced with the idea of compromise.
The other hypothesis is less complicated and speculative. It asserts that the 
killer has sought protection against the forceful use of self-help, claiming that 
he has paid a ransom – poinē, and therefore he is supposed to avoid revenge. 
Consequently the subject is a matter of fact – whether or not the defendant 
dispute concerns a simple matter of facts, whether or not the poinē has been paid, 
whether the obligation was fulfilled or not, 431. 
17 W. Leaf, “The Trial Sceene in Iliad XVIII”, Journal of hellenic Studies 8 (1887), 122 
– 132; R. Köstler, homerisches recht, Wien 1950, 69; D. M. MacDowell, op. cit. (fn. 
13), 19 – 20; M. Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian homicide Law, New Haven 
1981, 13 – 16; M. Gagarin, Early Greek Law, Berkeley 1989, 32 – 33; N. Hammond, 
op. cit. (fn. 12), 81; R. Westbrook, “The Trial Scene in the Iliad”, harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology 94 (1992), 53 – 76, etc.
18 M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1981), 13 – 16.
19 M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 28 – 33. R. Köstler, op. cit. (fn. 17), 69.
20 M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 27. Arbitration theory was accepted by many 
important older authorities like J. H. Lipsius, Das Attische recht und rechtsverfahren, 
Leipzig 1905-1915, 6; R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, op. cit. (fn. 16), 31; K. Latte, heiliges 
recht, Tübingen 1920, 2f.; G. M. Calhoun, Introduction to Greek Legal Science, Oxford 
1944. 9, etc. The general premise of this theory was that private arbitration had 
been gradually transformed into a compulsory trial before public authorities. 
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has paid a wergild, blood-money, poinē. Accordingly the case was not a private 
arbitration, but a kind of public control of self-help. This assumption has been 
raised by Wolff and was widely accepted for many years by the majority of scho-
lars, particularly by legal historians.21 On the other hand Gagarin has revived the 
arbitration theory, together with the claims that a legal issue is at stake.22 
After convincing criticism of Gagarin’s postulates that adduced the con-
cept of arbitration, Thür turned back to Wolff’s approach. However, Thür 
also rejected some elements of Wolff’s theory and tried to modify it. Wolff 
was claiming that the elders had to resolve the case immediately and defini-
tely (taking into account reactions of the gathered people, who supported by 
shouting judgment of the most convincing elder). However, Thür believes that 
each elder proposed not a final decision but only formulated an oath (a met-
hod of proof for Beweisurteil) and decided which of the litigants had to submit 
to it.23 Therefore, Thür reiterates attitude that the issue is simply about the 
fact – whether or not poinē has been paid. On the other side, on the basis of 
comparative data from the Near East legal systems and oriental legal traditi-
ons, Westbrook asserts that the court was not deciding only about the facts 
(accomplishing of poinē), but also whether the plaintiff is entitled to revenge.24 
Nevertheless, thanks to relatively recent contributions by Eva Cantarella and 
Gerhard Thür, it seems that at this moment the prevailing view is that the 
Homeric trial scene is not an arbitration process but public control of self-help, 
and that its subject matter was the issue of facts.25
21 H. J. Wolff, “The Origin of Judicial Litigation among the Greeks”, Traditio 4 (1946), 
31 – 87 (34 pp.). His approach was accepted by many eminent scholars like A. R. 
W. Harrison, The Law of Athens, II, Oxford 1971, 69 – 72; E. Ruschenbusch, “Der 
Ursprung des gerichtlichen Rechtsstreits bei den Griechen”, in: Symposion 1977, 
Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Cologne 1982, 1 – 8, etc.
22 M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 31 – 33. Before Gagarin it was H. Hommel, op. 
cit. (fn. 16), 16 who reaffirmed the arbitration.
23 G. Thür, “Oath and Dispute Settlement in Ancient Greek Law”, in: Greek Law in its 
Political Setting: Justification not Justice (eds. L. Foxhall, A. Lewis), Oxford 1996, 61: 
“the magistrate does not decide on guilt or innocence but only gives a judgement 
about the oath-formula which, if taken, will automatically resolve the dispute”. His 
view was supported by R. Sealey, The Justice of the Greeks, Ann Arbor 1994, 100.
24 R. Westbrook, op. cit. (fn. 17), 53. His view was followed by G. Nagy, “The Shield 
of Achilles. Ends of the Iliad and beginnings of the Polis”, in: New Light on a Dark 
Age (ed. S. H. Langdon), Columbia, London 1997, 194.
25 E. Cantarella, “Dispute Settlement in Homer: once again on the Shield of Achilles”, 
in: Mélanges en l’honneur Panayotis D. Dimakis, Athens 2002, 147 – 165 (= E. Can-
tarella, “Dispute Settlement in Homer: once again on the Shield of Achilles”, in: 
Sima Avramović: Blood-money in homer – role of istor in the Trial Scene...734
2.3. The next controversial issue is who is entitled to get the two talents 
and who is paying them? This is also an old debate: “some understand that the 
two talents of gold are to go to the judge who gives the best judgement, others 
that they are to go to the litigant who pleads his cause best”, as Sidgwick also 
put it by the end of the last century.26 We do not know much more today. Is 
it a blood-price that goes to the victim’s family, a bet of the two parties which 
will be taken by the winner, like a genuine wergild deposit?27 Or it was a judi-
cial wager (fee, award) that goes to the elder who gives the best verdict, a kind 
of a “court fee”?28 Myres supposed that it was a customary fee for someone 
who gives a voluntary decision from the agora (crowd), if this decision was 
adopted by the elders as better than their own.29 Wolff believes that the two 
talents were to go to the elder who won the greatest applause from the crowd.30 
However, there is also another controversial issue raised by Rodolphe Dareste 
some time ago connected to that amount: are the two talents a sum of money 
that goes as an extra value to the winner, which he will take along with the 
initial amount which was at stake?31 These are very problematic, peculiar and 
extremely arguable topics to deal with and must be set aside here, particularly 
as the list of questions is not closed. 
2.4. In fact the most important inquiry for us here is: who is in charge to 
decide the case? Gathered people, a crowd, a kind of democratic body, as Lanni 
states, following MacDowell’s and Wolff’s basic reasoning?32 
Diritto e società in Grecia e a Roma, Milano 2012, 171 – 192); G. Thür, “Der Reini-
gungseid im archaischen griechischen Rechtsstreit und seine Parallelen im Alten 
Orient”, in: Rechtsgeschichte und Interkulturalität (eds. R. Rollinger, H. Barta, M. 
Lang), Wiesbaden 2007, 179 – 195). 
26 H. Sidgwick, op. cit. (fn. 15), 1. R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, op. cit. (fn. 16), 37 – 38 
outline in detail different explanations of the two talents’ purpose.
27 J. H. Lipsius, op. cit. (fn. 20), 4. He was followed by many others in that view.
28 G. Glotz, La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce, Paris 1904, 128. 
Similar was the view of Sir H. S. Maine, Ancient Law, London 1861, 386. He argued 
that the amount was a deposit by the litigants for the judge who shall explain the 
grounds of his decision most to the satisfaction of the audience.
29 J. L. Myres, Political Ideas of the Greeks, New York 1927, 64.
30 H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 42. 
31 R. Dareste, “Sur un passage de l’Iliade”, in: Annuaire de l’Association pour l’encourage-
ment des études grecques en France 18 (1884), 94.
32 A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens, Cambridge 2006, 139 fn. 
89. She claims that in the trial scene depicted on the shield of Achilles, “the crowd 
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If not the people, gerontes were supposed to decide through a formal public 
procedure, as Gagarin and many others suggest. The source is quite explicit 
by saying that they, the elders dikazon (line 18.506) – give a verdict.33 Also, as 
mentioned, Thür has offered an interesting compromising idea that gerontes do 
not propose a concrete settlement of the dispute but rather a method of proof 
(Beweisverfahren).34 
But, what is then the role of istor? Why is he present at all? Why do the 
people expect some say from him? Is his say a kind of verdict? And, therefore, 
is he a kind of judge or at least an arbiter? MacDowell suggests three possibili-
ties. According to him, istor can be: a) the chairman of the proceedings (either 
the king, or an elder who presides over the others); b) the elder whose opinion 
is considered by the people to be the best (the opinion which receives the most 
applause is the one which is accepted); c) it refers to all the elders, and the 
view of the majority prevails. Although he claims that none of solutions can be 
definitely disproved, he inclines to b), and stresses the role of people who will 
decide which elder’s judgement is to be accepted.35
Let us remember that almost all translations suggest that the istor is either 
a judge or an arbiter (nevertheless some translators try to soften the word 
“arbiter” with “umpire” or “referee”). However, both the first and the second 
theory (judge or arbiter) are facing with a great problem: how to explain the 
relationship between the istor and the gerontes then?36 If the istor is a judge, 
played a vital role in the decision making process: various elders take turns wielding 
the scepter and suggesting a ruling, but it is the crowd who decides by acclamation 
which ruling is accepted”; D. M. MacDowell, op. cit. (fn. 13), 21; H. J. Wolff, op. 
cit. (fn. 21), 41. Of course, the presence of people from the community is not ir-
relevant, but it is quite doubtful if they had a final say in making decisions.
33 Parties plead their case in a public forum (in the agora) to a circle of elders, each of 
whom in turn takes a scepter (a symbol of public authority), stands, and pronoun-
ces a settlement. Clearly this is a formal, public procedure, providing a means for 
litigants to bring their disputes to an authoritative body for settlement, M. Gagarin, 
op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 26 – 33.
34 G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 23), 57 – 73: gerontes offered a method of proof by means of 
which the dispute will automatically be settled (and let us add: it could explain the 
presumption that one who suggested the best “method” achieves the award, a kind 
of judicial wager). According to his opinion, the dispute is about a simple matter of 
fact, whether or not the poinē has been paid.
35 D. M. MacDowell, op. cit. (fn. 13), 20 – 21.
36 This is also an old dilemma raised by H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 37 – 38. He cites 
Jolowicz’s comparative law explanation based upon comparison of the istor with the 
English jury in its most primitive form and with the medieval Germanic law.
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what are the gerontes doing then? If the istor is an arbiter and his opinion ends 
the dispute, what kind of role should play a body of the distinguished elders? 
Or, as many scholars suppose, the istor is to be found amongst the elders: the 
istor will be the one who wins the award (Dareste, Wolff).37 
3. THE ISTOR – NEITHER A JUDGE NOR AN ARBITER
Let us try to add to the lively discussion a rather different approach, which 
would not confront or merge the roles of the istor and of the gerontes. My pre-
sumption is that the istor was something else, a kind of a separate “institution”, 
a specific authority which is neither a judge nor an arbiter. The explanation is 
going to be based upon linguistic arguments, other verses in Iliad where istor 
was mentioned, and to some cases from comparative legal history. 
Raymond Westbrook, with his comparatist approach, tries to explain the 
trial scene in Iliad having in mind parallels with legal tradition and procedure 
in murder cases of Ancient East. He explains many controversial Greek terms 
from the trial scene (εὔχετο, ἀποδοῦναι, πάντ(α), πιφαύσκων, ἀναίνετο, ἑλέσθαι)38, 
but declines to clarify the key nouns ίστωρ and γέροντες. No wonder, as there 
are many linguistic obstacles, apart from the difficulty arising from common 
sense: if the istor decides, what is then the role of the elders? And, on the other 
hand, if the gerontes are those who are supposed to rule, why should the istor 
be involved in the procedure at any point? The only remaining solution to this 
puzzle, which became widely accepted, is that the istor was one of the gerontes 
(the one who gives the best verdict).39 However, this popular attitude meets 
an unpleasant linguistic obstacle: the poet says epi istori peirar helesthai, not that 
the istor is supposed to dikazein. Dikazein is the job of the collective body of hoi 
gerontes, as clearly declared in verse 18.506.40
37 G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 23), 67 is resolutely against that general assumption with sound 
reasons.
38 “The	 one	 was	 claiming	 (eukheto)	 to	 pay	 (apodounai)	 all	 (panta)	 expounding	
(piphauskōn)	 to	 the	demos;	 the	other	was	 refusing	(anaineto)	 to	 take	(helethai)”,	R.	
Westbrook,	op. cit. (fn.	17),	73	–	76.
39 To mention only H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 38; D. M. MacDowell, op. cit. (fn. 13), 
20; M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 31. But G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 23), 67 rightly 
states that he would disassociate the istor from the elder winning the award.
40 G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 23), 67 has shown that theory about the istor as one of gerontes 
who gave the best ruling (as Wolff believed) is not convincing, as well as MacDowell’s 
statement that the istor is “the elder whose opinion is considered by the people to be 
the best”. It is a very speculative idea, particularly when it is connected with the role 
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This is probably why Fagles (1990) has found the best solution in his En-
glish translation by avoiding words like “decision” or “verdict” or “arbitrati-
on”, which were so frequently used by other translators. He opted for a more 
flexible wording for peirar helesthai - to “cut the knot”, similarly as Rieu (1950) 
translated it more neutrally with “should be settled”.41 They do not take for 
granted in what capacity the istor will act (judge, arbiter or something else) and 
what kind of legal effect his statement will have (verdict, decision, judgement, 
or simply a statement). 
Also, if one wants to keep more or less dependably with the phrasing of 
the original text, epi (istori) should be translated “in front of (istor)” or maybe 
“at the hands of (istor)”, as MacDowell translates. It hardly refers to a certain 
decision making procedure “by”, “from” the istor. The parties simply wanted to 
solve their case in his presence on the basis of his statement.42 In short, at phi-
lological ground nothing suggests that the istor was a person who was supposed 
to give a judgement (dikazein). And, of course, as istor is used in singular, there 
is no room to compare him with a collective body of the gerontes, elders (except 
by the very dubious hypothesis that the istor is one of the elders, possibly the 
one who offers the best decision).
In consequence, it seems that compelling philological support for transla-
ting and understanding that the istor gives a final decision or a verdict is lac-
king. We should therefore conclude that the istor was probably not a judge. He 
was doing something else.
3.1. The problem in translating is difficult inasmuch as the word istor itself 
is quite vague and unclear. The root-value of the word, related to the defective-
irregular verb (w)oida, with the stem wid-, indicates “awareness” or “knowing” 
of the crowd allegedly supposed to decide which decision was the best. The issue of 
how could it be done (through applauds or cheers), as MacDowell suggests, is also 
very speculative. It was evidently not performed by some voting procedure.
41 Or “to obtain a limit” as Elmer suggested recently, D. F. Elmer, The Poetics of Con-
sent, Collective Decision making and the Iliad, Baltimore 2013, 186. 
42 I am grateful to comment by Omi Hatashin during my lecture at the University of 
Tokyo, who pointed latter in our correspondence, that the Greek preposition epi 
takes the corresponding genitive case when it means ‘near’, ‘in the presence of’, or 
‘by’ (locality). Therefore, the relevant text should read epi istoros (genitive case) in 
order to mean ‘in the presence of istor’. But, epi istori in the dative suggests that iēmi in 
the context of Iliad 18.501 is a verb of motion, and it could rather be translated as 
“relying on the evidence (testimony) of a witness”. In that case, the istor could be a 
witness, but also any other person on whose statement the decision depends.
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of some kind – “seeing” as correct perception.43 Application of the same word 
in Hesiod, and in tragedy centuries later as both Sophocles and Euripides use 
it, suggests that an (h)istor is “experienced, aware, in the know”, “one who 
knows”44, one who saw something. Worth mentioning is that many Slavic 
languages use the same root, better to say the same word – noun vid (to denote 
“eyesight”) and verb – videti (“to see”), equally as video in Latin. In that sense 
oida could mean “I know what I have seen”. The istor is consequently the one 
who saw something and who therefore knows something well. 
Does such etymology point to a judge or arbiter? Does the whole wording 
of the line 18.501 points to judicial decision? Maybe yes for a contemporary 
reader, but it is doubtful how it was perceived in the Homeric time. 
Not only logical discrepancy in relationship istor/gerontes, as mentioned 
above, points that the istor can be neither an arbiter nor a judge (or one of 
the elders who gave the best verdict). There is also an important philological 
ground – istor does not dikazein but peirar helesthai. The phrasing peirar helesthai 
(line 18.501), often translated as “decision”, should rather be “choose an end”, 
“obtain a limit” effected by means of hearing what the istor will say. He does 
not make a decision, but he “resolves” the issue, “cuts the knot” by his state-
ment. In my view, to “end the dispute” would be the most appropriate transla-
tion of that phrase. And after the istor’s act peirar helesthai, the operative, final 
decision lies in the hands of the elders who are supposed to dikazein. 
With what could a statement by the istor deal, what could it be about, 
what could be its content and purpose? Of course, the answer depends upon 
the character of the dispute: which of two alternative proposed scenarios is at 
issue?
43 Digamma (w) was a part of the word (w)oida, so that istor was in Boeotian and may-
be epic-Aeolian – (w)istor. I am grateful to Prof. Victor Castellani for this observati-
on and discussions of the issue, particularly for describing the applications of istor 
in Hesiod, Sophocles and Euripides noted below.
 Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 31 fn. 37 also asserts that the word histor (with 
initial h, and adds in brackets “arbiter”!) is derived from a root meaning “to see, 
to know”. But, he is of the opinion, without any argument, that it designates not 
a person who knows a particular fact, but someone who has the general wisdom to 
settle disputes! 
 It is curious that in all editions of the Liddell-Scott Dictionary there is no translation 
for the word istor as a noun. There is only an explanation of the verb istoreō with mea-
nings of “examine, observe, inquire of, ask”, etc, but also “to give an account of what one 
has learnt, record”, G. Liddell, R. Scott, A Greek and English Lexicon, Oxford 1869, 842.
44 R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, op. cit. (fn. 16), 35 fn. 2 and H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 38 
state firmly that the word istor means “expert or one who knows”.
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The first one is that the contention was over facts. In that case the istor 
might have been a competent person to say (attest, confirm, report) if the 
amount was properly paid or not. If it was, it would mean the end of the story 
and no further decision would be needed. On the other hand, if he asserts that 
the amount was not appropriate or was paid only partially, this opens room 
for the decision by men of wisdom, respectable gerontes, about what to do next. 
They could offer different opinions on what, in that case, should be the con-
sequence for the delinquent.
The second possibility – that the matter of controversy was a legal issue – 
includes at least two potential roles for an istor. Firstly, as a person who was 
present during previous cases as a kind of an official responsible to store in 
memory what he had seen, he might only give a statement on what he remem-
bers about the similar cases (istor – a rememberer). Secondly, at the same time, 
he could be expected to remember the outcome of this actual case, in order to 
attest in the future what the result was in this case. 
On these terms, istor would again be neither a judge nor an arbiter, but only 
a person who will offer a preliminary relevant statement about what he knows. 
Of course, this is hypothesis; however, all other explanations of the trial scene 
in Iliad are more or less speculative as well. In any case, philology and wording 
of the poem do not favor conclusion about istor as a judge or an arbiter.
This is why at this point, after we must dismiss so many different English 
translations, Thür’s attempt at German translation offers the most moderate 
and sensible path. He avoids any modern term as a possible explanation for 
the istor and stays with the Greek specific word, suggesting some possible mea-
nings in parenthesis: “Beide waren bereit, bei einem istor (einem ‘Wissenden’: 
Schiedsrichter, Richter, Zeugen?) die endgültige Entscheidung zu nehmen”.45 
It fits well with Bonner-Smith’s translation “expert” or “one who knows”.46 
Cantarella made an important step forward by suggesting that the istor was a 
person who had been present at the moment of payment, but not as a simple 
witness. Instead, he had played a specific role in delivering the poinē, similar 
to the role played by Odysseus during the payment of the ransom to Achilles 
in Iliad Book 19.47
45 G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 25), 182. Just to add that Wolff, who argued against arbitration 
theory, did not find a better translation for istor apart of daysman (mediator), H. J. 
Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 37.
46 R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, op. cit. (fn. 16), 35, fn. 2; H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 38.
47 E. Cantarella, op. cit. (fn. 25) (2002), 160 – 161 (= (2012), 186 – 187).
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Therefore, as Cantarella has clearly shown, “one who knows” might not 
only be an arbiter, judge or witness. Comparative legal history could provide 
other possibilities as well. So we approach the core of the issue. However, be-
fore getting to that, let us briefly recall another place in the Iliad where istor is 
also mentioned.
3.2. Some help may come from the only instance left in the Iliad where 
Homer uses the same word istor, depicting another famous scene of the fune-
ral games. In the Iliad 23, 486 Idomeneus and Little Ajax are in dispute over 
which of them has correctly recognized whose horses and chariot are in the 
lead, and they propose laying a bet on it and appointing Agamemnon as istor. 
Agamemnon is also their superior, Achaean commander-in-chief, and would 
be unlikely to decide until he can see for himself! Eyewitness, testis, observer, 
spectator, bystander fits well in this relationship. It might seem to a modern 
reader to be the function of witness. However, he was surely not a witness 
in a juridical sense, as he was not produced by one party for the purpose of 
confirming his plea.48 Gagarin believes that Agamemnon is an arbiter in this 
case and that he decides the outcome of the race.49 However, it would be quite 
bizarre for the king Agamemnon to be a witness or an arbiter in such a trivial 
situation. He could only, at the very least, give a statement on his impression 
(knowledge) according to his perception of what he had seen.
In addition Thür claims quite plausibly that Agamemnon is not supposed 
to decide outcome of the race: in the event everybody will be able to observe 
who actually will have come in first. According to Thür, Agamemnon’s only 
task would have been to hold the stake money and hand it over to the winner. 
That is why Thür believes that Agamemnon did not have to act as arbitrator, 
rather he was a guarantor that the bet would be paid out correctly.50
Some parallels can be detected between the two Homeric scenes, althou-
gh the word istor is used in the shield scene in a quite different context than 
during the chariot race (different circumstances, different social rank of istor, 
and different societal importance of the case). The istor is the one who knows 
something from his personal experience (“knower”), who acts as a person of 
public trust about something that he observed by his own eyes, and who is at 
some point supposed to give a statement on what he knows and who guaran-
48 It was rightly observed already by H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 38.
49 M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 31 fn. 37.
50 G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 23), 67.
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tees fair outcome. Nothing more than that. What this statement will mean 
and what kind of power and effect his statement will have depends upon his 
authority.
In any case, the statement of the istor is not a judgement, a verdict in a 
legal sense. A verdict (as a possible outcome of dikazein in 18.506 and 508) is 
a result of certain procedure. The istor is only supposed to give a report (sta-
tement) which can help in solving the dispute because of his authority. In the 
same way Agamemnon was not formally a judge in the case of a chariot race 
but only a person who saw the event and whose opinion is reliable. Therefore 
Hammond is fully convinced that there is no doubt: istor means “one who 
knows”, in the Achilles’ shield scene as well as at Iliad 23.486.51 I would put 
the matter in a more general and broader formulation: as a result of seeing so-
mething (oida), the istor is a person who knows something and reports on that 
as a trusted person of public authority. 
 
3.3. Finally, we come to the most sensitive point – available arguments 
from comparative legal history and anthropology. Of course, the value of such 
material is often subject to question.52 Nevertheless, we evidently lack more se-
cure evidence in Greek sources, in documents and by etymology, for the actual 
meaning of istor, in particular concerning his role in judicial procedure. This is 
why Wolff firmly believes that the shield scene “is one of the cases where the 
comparative method is the way to illuminate a story which is not told with 
sufficient precision”.53 Therefore it makes sense to take into account examples 
from other early, preliterate or mostly illiterate societies that socially and cul-
turally correspond to the Homeric world.54 Similar problems often find similar 
51 N. G. L. Hammond, op. cit. (fn. 12), 81.
52 G. Thür, op. cit. (fn. 23), 57 rightly points that there is a risk in anthropological 
approach. Similarities could sometimes be misleading. Nevertheless at some point 
an anthropological and comparative approach remains the only way forward for 
our investigation if the evidence from literary sources has been fully exhausted. For 
understanding of the Homeric shield scene, after many decades of unsettled contro-
versy, there is little left in documentary Greek sources to be examined.
53 H. J. Wolff, op. cit. (fn. 21), 35.
54 M. Gagarin, op. cit. (fn. 17) (1989), 30 – 31 also tries to find some explanations of 
the trial scene in Homer using the analogy with some African societies. K. A. Raafla-
ub, “Homeric Society”, in: A New Companion to homer (eds. I. Mooris, B. Powell), 
Leiden 1997, 648 asserts that, generally speaking, customs in early societies have 
their analogies in other cultures and can be explicated with the help of anthropo-
logy and sociology.
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responses in diverse civilizations. A salient common feature – to us, a problem 
– of early societies and their judicial processes was oral ruling and absence of 
writing to record actions and indeed of any written evidence.55
3.3.1. One institution comparable to istor-ship comes from the Cretan city 
of Gortyn. Fortunately, its legal system is quite well known because of the well 
preserved “Code of Gortyn” from the 5th century B.C.56 Despite the interval 
of time between the Homeric period and the time of the Gortyn codification, 
comparison could be valid, parallels instructive, inasmuch as the two societies 
involved shared similar impediments in times when writing was absent or at 
least not widespread. 
We find in Gortyn a quite well-known and important court official – the 
mnāmōn (the Doric form of the word, having the root in mnēmē, mnēmoneuō 
– “remember”, with a specific Doric long alpha instead of Attic eta). There-
fore the mnāmōn is “remembrancer”, “rememberer”. “memorizer”, “recorder”, 
“a man of memory”.57 If one follows etymology, sense and logic of the word 
mnāmōn, its meaning overlaps with that of the istor as “one who knows”.
One of the duties of the mnāmōn in Gortyn was to keep the record in his 
mind as long as he lived and to give information of previous decisions when it 
is needed.58 He is a person whose duty is to see, to watch, to follow the case 
and to remember its outcome.59 He is a “living archive” of cases which were 
55 A valuable book that considers ancient Greek experience with law and writing is M. 
Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, Cambridge 2011.
56 R. Willetts, The Code of Gortyn, Berlin 1967 is still the most useful edition with 
English translation.
57 A. Lanni, op. cit. (fn. 32), 126 fn. 39 translates mnāmōn as “rememberer”, also in A. 
Lanni, “Precedent and Legal Reasoning in Classical Athenian Courts: A Noble 
Lie?“, The American Journal of Legal history 43, 1 (1999), 27-51 (46). J. Davies, “The 
Code of Gortyn”, in: The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (eds. M. Gaga-
rin, D. Cohen), Cambridge 2005, 310 translates mnāmōn as “rememberancer”.
58 Code of Gortyn, IX 31: “If the suit be with reference to a judgment won, the judge 
and the recorder… shall testify”. Therefore R. Willetts 47 translates there mnāmōn 
as “recorder”.
59 mnāmōn is also mentioned explicitly in the Code of Gortyn, XI 16 but rather as a kind 
of judiciary official: “…and he shall deposit ten staters with the court, and the secre-
tary (of the magistrate) who is concerned with strangers shall pay it to the person 
renounced” (Willetts, 49 translates mnāmōn here as “the secretary”). mnāmōn is 
mentioned for the third time in Code of Gortyn, XI 53: “and let the initiator of the 
suit make his denunciation to the woman and the judge and the secretary (of the 
court)” – Willetts’ translation is “the secretary” again.
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decided in the past, a person who keeps in his memory judicial processes. It is 
rightly claimed that the mnāmōn “share with the judge the potential power of 
being a witness to the results of past cases, hence both officials have authori-
tative knowledge”.60 The mnāmōn was likely an early helper to Cretan kosmoi 
and only later in the long flow of legal history did he end up as a scribe in Hel-
lenistic inscriptions. Beside mnāmones in Gortyn and Crete, some other Greek 
localities used hieromnāmones with the same or similar function (at Delphi and 
at Tiryns, Argos, Mycene and elsewhere in the Peloponnese).61 It seems that 
a comparable institution was quite widespread all over Greece, probably as a 
remnant of a common, earlier legal tradition. Although there is no solid source 
to confirm connection between these institutions and that of istor, an ana-
logy seems quite plausible. In these two preliterate societies (the time distance 
between them notwithstanding), the istor could have had a similar role to that 
of the mnāmōn in Gortyn and other parts of Greece centuries later.62 At least 
the istor was a person of public authority, a person who knows (remembers) 
something and reports on that at the court under circumstances when there 
were no written records of any legal or judicial acts. 
3.3.2. A very similar tradition is well attested within the old Slav customary 
law, among many Slavic people during the preliterate age. Pristav was a person 
of “public trust”63, engaged to assist the judge in running judicial procedure. In 
60 R. Thomas, “Writing, Law and Written Law”, in: The Cambridge Companion to Ancient 
Greek Law (eds. M. Gagarin, D. Cohen), Cambridge 2005, 48. M. Gagarin, “Letters 
of the Law: Written Texts in Archaic Greek Law”, in: Written Texts and the rise of 
Literate Culture in Ancient Greece (ed. H. Yunis), Cambridge 2003, 59 – 77 rightly ob-
serves that at Gortyn, the mnāmōn continues to remember oral judicial proceedings 
even after writing has been established, 63. He also rightly adds that he remembered 
the proceedings and outcomes of trials and certain other matters, but he did not re-
member rules, which were now preserved in writing. Nor is there any evidence that 
he remembered the outcomes of earlier cases as precedents or rules for new cases, 68.
61 R. Thomas, “Written in Stone? Liberty, Equality, Orality and the Codification of 
Law”, in: Greek Law in the Political Settings, Oxford 1996, 9 – 32. This is one of the 
best overviews in the literature of the role and evolution of mnāmones in ancient 
Greece, 18.
62 I	am	following	here	the	path	of	thinking	traced	by	L.	Margetić,	“Pokušaj	pravne	
interpretacije	 sudske	 scene	na	Ahilovu	 štitu”	 [An	Attempt	 to	 Interpret	 the	Trial	
Scene	on	the	Shield	of	Achilles],	in:	Zbornik radova posvećen Albertu Vajsu,	Beograd	
1966,	51	–	58.
63 The	most	comprehensive	book	on	pristav	is	M.	Kostrenčić,	Fides publica (javna vera) 
u pravnoj istoriji Srba i Hrvata do kraja XV veka [Fides publica (public trust) in Legal 
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the transitional period when court decisions were not written, but given only 
orally by the judge, pristav “was given” to the person who won the case as a 
warranty, in order to have a valid proof in the future about the result of the 
trial. Although pristav assisted to the judge in some other procedural actions, 
his most important duty was to report about the outcome of certain cases.64 
Pristav was not a court official comparable to the judge, both in knowledge and 
in social background and authority. However, he usually was a person from a 
well-known family, with social prominence and prestige, in any case a person 
of public trust. That institution and that person were highly respected, as they 
helped society to avoid new quarrels and disputes about results of some earlier 
cases and to ensure a kind of judicial stability and continuity. 
Pristav kept a condensed memory of courts and rulings in undeveloped, 
non-literate societies. Only gradually, during a long process, was transformed 
into an assistant of the judges.65 It is clear that in the beginning pristav was not 
a permanent judicial position – a man of that designation was only delegated 
by a judge to the winning party of a particular case as a guarantee, in order to 
facilitate enforcement of judgement or even, if necessary, to help in clarifica-
tion of the court decision. If a problem arose pristav was there to give a state-
ment about the facts that he had seen and knew, always in the presence of the 
interested parties. This is why Slavic medieval sources define pristav as assertor 
veritatis or the one who is used pro testimonio or “for a stronger conviction”.66 
He was not expected to have any kind of professional experience but only to be 
recognized by his community as an honest and impartial person. As attested 
history of Serbs and Croats up to the end of XV century],	Beograd	1930.	At one point 
Kostrenčić compares the functions of mnāmōn and pristav, 68. He claims that in 
the time when literacy was not yet well developed and when judgements were not 
written, it was a problem to maintain a lasting record of court rulings. Therefore 
pristav had to be present all the time during the court procedure, particularly when 
the judgement was given. At the end of the process the judge would assign the pri-
stav to the winning party to support him in enforcing the judgement or to help to 
interpret the essence of the court decision at some later time, 21.
64 This role of pristav is nearly the same as the role of mnāmōn in the Code of Gortyn 
IX 31. M. Kostrenčić, ibid., 5 defines pristav as a person whose oral statements were 
privileged as those of public trust.
65 The	developed	function	of	the	pristav	has	a	very	significant	parallel	to	mnāmōn in	
the	Code	of	Gortyn	XI	16.	Therefore	S.	Novaković,	Zakonik Stefana Dušana cara 
srpskog [Code of Stephen Dushan, the Serbian Tzar], Beograd	1898	(commentary	with	
the	Art.	56)	perceives	pristav as	an	assistant	of	a	judge.
66 M. Kostrenčić, op. cit. (fn. 63), 16.
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in sources from medieval Dalmatia he was later also employed to call upon 
parties to the trial, to perform preliminary investigation, to test witnesses, to 
be present during the oath taking procedure, etc. Only gradually, in the further 
evolution of the institution, did pristav become a kind of scribe, at the very end 
of the office’s development a kind of notary public.67 
Preliterate societies or early literate ones with a poor literacy rate had a se-
rious problem with recording the court decisions. Although the corresponding 
institutions in the Gortyn Code (mnāmōn) and the old Slavic person autho-
rized by customary law (presto) belong to different eras than the Iliad, their 
function, social environment, and at least some likeness in logic and purpose 
of the three institutions invite comparison. Consequently they could be a kind 
of road sign toward clarifying the role of the istor in Homer.
 
3.3.3. Quite a long time ago Walter Leaf had launched an idea, basically 
one expressed before him by Sir Arthur Evans, that customary material from 
Northern Albania could be of help in understanding the Homeric trial scene.68 
However, Leaf complained that the evidence was scarce and expected that 
Evans would report more on the blood-feud in North Albania. Unfortunately, 
this did not happen, as Evans soon moved his investigations to Montenegro 
and Crete.69 About a century later, in the 1980s, N. Hammond stressed again 
the importance of studying Albanian custom as a possible source for better 
consideration of the trial in Iliad and gave an outline on that.70 He had recalled 
67 S.	 Avramović,	 “Pravnoistorijski	 aspekti	 notarijata”	 [Aspects	 of	Notary	 Public	 in	
Legal	History],	in:	Javnobeležničko pravo,	Beograd	2005,	35	–	83.	
68 W. Leaf, op. cit. (fn. 17), 122 – 132.
69 Missing that, Leaf recalls examples from early Roman law to explain the trial scene 
in Homer. In the prevalent comparativist manner of that time, he believed that a 
signpost	could	be	found	in	the	interesting	passage	mentioned	in	Sir	Henry	Sumner	









70 He offered a short contribution with a similar approach – to link the trial scene 
from Homeric society with the Albanian customary law of a more recent time, N. 
Hammond, op. cit. (fn. 12), 79 – 86.
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his travel and research in Albania in the 1930s and the researches of Margaret 
Hasluck.71 He mainly accepts her findings, and his parallels are mostly based 
upon comparisons with the procedure as found in the so called Code of Leke 
Dukagjini (Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit).72 Hammond mainly deals with the most 
controversial rules of the Kanun (on procedure: how murder was handled to 
avoid blood-feud, particularly in book 10, articles 886-990). Despite his great 
authority in ancient Greek history73, he used second-hand sources for Albani-
an customary law and he failed more thoroughly to investigate two important 
institutions, those which could be more closely pertinent to the Homeric trial 
scene. It is no wonder that he missed them. Most papers dealing with those old 
Albanian customary institutions are published in languages that are not widely 
understood (Albanian, Serbian).
Indeed, there is interesting and likewise relevant material coming from the 
research on customary law of Albanians in the area of Kosovo and Metohia 
(not only Northern Albania). It appears in a number of works written in Serbi-
an, including two PhD theses defended at the University of Belgrade in 1973 
and 1978. These have never been published, so their results are not at all easily 
accessible.74 Nevertheless, a pair of customary institutions carefully examined 
in those two dissertations are particularly interesting for assessment of the trial 
scene on Achilles’ shield.
71 M. Hasluck, The Unwritten Law in Albania, Cambridge 1954, 210 – 260.
72 The	Code	was	allegedly	formed	in	the	15th	century	by	Leka	Dukagjini,	most	pro-
bably	 in	oral	 form.	The	 rules	were	collected	and	written	down	only	 in	 the	19th	
century	by	Catholic	priest	Shtjefën	Gjeçovi.	The	full	version	was	first	published	in	
Albanian	as	Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit,	Shkodër	1933	after	Gjeçovi’s	death	in	1926.	
The	translation	in	(then	official)	Serbo-Croat	language	appeared	as	Kanon Leke Du-
kadjinija,	Zagreb	1986.	An	English	version	was	published	as	The Code of Lekë Dukagji-




73 Let	us	 just	mention	N.	G.	L.	Hammond,	A History of Greece to 322 B.C.,	Oxford	
1986.
74 M.	Djuričić,	Lično jemstvo u običajnom pravu Arbanasa u severnoj Metohiji - dorzonija 
[Personal Warranty in Customary Law of Albanians in Northern Metohia – dorzon],	
Belgrade	1973	(unpublished	PhD	thesis);	H.	Ismaili,	Plećnija u običajnom pravu Al-
banaca [Plechnija in Customary Law of Albanians],	Belgrade	1978	(unpublished	PhD	
thesis).	Moreover,	 these	 two	 intriguing	PhD	 theses	were	 never	 translated	 into	 a	
more	accesible	language.
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The first is plechnija, a court of elders that was already mentioned by Leaf as 
pljech.75 To some extent this can clarify the role of gerontes as judges. In impor-
tant cases, particularly when blood-feud was at stake, a specific court of elders 
(plechnija) made the decision case after case. Although it usually consisted of 
twelve men, the number of members was not strictly fixed. Furthermore, these 
elders (plechniars) were not necessarily the same persons, although they often 
came from the same social group within the greater community.76 They would 
sit in a semi-circle with their legs crossed, facing one another, leaving in the 
middle enough space for the parties and other persons called upon to speak 
during the trial.77 Members of the plechnija received a certain sum of money, 
but only when and if the case was solved. The judicial reward was typically 
called “compensation for the shoes”.78 The most frequent cases that appeared 
before this plechnija were murder ones, but also cases dealing with wounding, 
debts, theft, property rights, family, marriage, etc.79 
The second specific institution in the procedure before plechnija leads us 
closer to the istor. It was called dorzon, dorzanët (literally: guarantor, guaran-
tors). The role of dorzon is closely connected with the “judgement” of plechnija, 
as plechnar or plechnars do not basically rule like judges. They do not give a 
verdict; rather they only expound their opinion on what is right and how to 
determine the amount of damage. However, without the dorzon their decision 
would be only a non-enforceable legal opinion, and this is why the plechnar has 
75 W. Leaf, op. cit. (fn. 17), 126 fn. 1 says wrongly “pljech or village council (literally 
– gerousia)”. However, sometimes there could be only one plechnar, M. Djuričić, op. 





of	Leke	Dukagjini],	Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of Law in 
Belgrade]	5	(1970),	531	–	543.	See	further	M.	Djuričić,	“Veća	staraca	kod	Albanaca	
na	Kosovu”	[Council	of	elders	at	Kosovo],	Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals 
of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade]	5	(1984),	708	–	726;	M.	Djuričić,	“Činioci	krvne	
osvete	 kod	 Albanaca”	 [Factors	 of	 Blood-Feud	 among	 Albanians],	 Anali Pravnog 
fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade],	6	(1993),	687	–	692.	
77 H. Ismaili, op. cit. (fn. 74), 62.
78 H. Ismaili, ibid., 53; Code of Leke Dukagjini, art. 1021. Parties give the same amo-
unt for the elders’ “shoes”. The term is doubtless used figuratively, indicating that 
the amount is merely to reimburse costs of their arrival. However, in practice the 
amount was considerably higher, H. Ismaili, ibid., 54.
79 H. Ismaili, ibid., 36.
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the dorzon in order to execute the decision.80 The dorzon is a guarantee that the 
opinion of the plechnar will be respected.
The dorzon was a person elected by the parties to see that the decision 
between them would be properly fulfilled.81 Each party acquired his own dor-
zon, but there are specific provisions for a blood-feud dorzon. He had to make 
sure that the decision of plechnija would be accomplished in good time and as 
it was specified. If the killer tried to escape or to delay due payment, the dorzon 
called him before the gathered people to warn him.82 Blood-money was always 
given to a dorzon by the murderer and the dorzon passed it to the family of the 
victim – it was not permitted for the murderer to pay the blood-money to the 
victim’s family directly.83
In short, the dorzon had multiple functions as a person of public trust.84 He 
was there to remember what the decree of the plechnija was, to take care that 
it would be fulfilled: he was “one-who-knows” the case, who was a guarantor 
of the blood-feud contract and who was responsible for proper fulfillment of 
the compromise (that is, the finding of the plechnia). And he was supposed to 
remember, and to attest if necessary, the outcome of the case in the coming de-
cades, until the end of his life. The dorzon was a warranty in many legal matters 
(inheritance, diverse contracts), but his role is particularly important in blo-
od-feud cases. Blood-feud procedure was performed through two contracts.85 
The first was an agreement about the blood-feud when one party permanently 
waived his right to demand the blood-price, while the other party assumed 
an obligation to pay a certain amount as a compensation for the unavenged 
death. The second was a contract about enforcement of the agreement by the 
dorzon who took care that the contract would be fully honored.
Although there are distinct parallels that may connect plechnija and dorzon 
with the Homeric gerontes and istor in some respects, there were likely signifi-
cant differences between those Balkan offices, on the one hand, and the ones 
referred to in the Iliad passage, on the other. Nevertheless it seems that both 
80 M. Djuričić, op. cit. (fn. 74), 351.
81 H. Ismaili, op. cit. (fn. 74), 178. This example from comparative legal history might 
generally support an idea by E. Cantarella, op. cit. (fn. 25) (2002), 160 (= (2012), 
186) that istor was a person who guaranteed that the blood-money would be 
correctly paid in accordance with the word given.
82 Code of Leke Dukagjini, art. 980.
83 Code of Leke Dukagjini, art. 981.
84 M. Djuričić, op. cit. (fn. 74), 175 – 214. 
85 M. Djuričić, ibid., 349.
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pairs served similar complementary purposes – to have someone who would 
take care as a warranty of the contracts or of decisions of the court of elders (to 
be fulfilled precisely as handed down), and to keep all important details of the 
case in trusted memory, exactly as the mnāmōn was charged to do at ancient 
Gortyn or the pristav among Slav people in the Middle Ages).
4. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding that most English translators take for granted that the 
istor is a judge or an arbiter, it seems that istor was not authorized to decide ca-
ses, especially those involving murder or blood-money. Those issues were pro-
bably not judged by a single person, particularly in early societies. Moreover 
it is quite doubtful whether a primitive democratic body consisting of people 
gathered by chance was empowered to reach a satisfactory decision in compli-
cated cases like this, what MacDowell and Lanni suggest. Homeric society was 
fundamentally aristocratic, so that some formal confirmation of elder’s decisi-
on by the crowd to make it effective was quite improbable. The crowd could of 
course express their feelings and attitudes during the public judicial process, 
and possibly influence the actual judge(s), but without any formal legal signi-
ficance. As in many other primitive societies the court of elders, the gerontes, 
were authorized to give a final verdict. But what, then, was the role of the istor?
The hypothesis that the istor was either the one of the elders who gave the 
best judgement or was the chairman of the gerontes has many deficiencies: it 
is contradicted by the very sequence of Homeric verses, by comparative early 
law experience, by the social-political conditions, by linguistic considerations, 
inter alia. Therefore the question remains: What was responsibility of the istor? 
If the istor was one who decided the case (as many translators suggest), why 
were gerontes needed at all? Or were there two types of judges involved, one 
to declare the law, the other to decide cases? From primarily philological and 
comparative arguments, it seems that istor was only a figure who helped the 
gerontes to reach the best possible verdict. He was a person of public trust who 
knew what he had seen (oida as the root of istor) and his role was to report to 
the crowd and the elders what relevant elements he knew and remembered. 
His stated recollection was very important, particularly in the context of an 
oral judicial procedure, which was not strictly fixed by writing and could vary 
in many features.
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However, even if this much is granted, there are two possibilities before us. 
The istor was present either to help in solving a legal matter (whether blood-
money was acceptable or not) or a matter of fact (whether the blood-money 
had been paid in the proper way).
Although any suggestion that the issue was about a question of law seems 
to be quite vulnerable, let us examine a possible role of the istor upon that 
hypothesis. If the issue was controversy over a difficult legal question relevant 
to blood-feud, why was presence of an istor so necessary? If his opinion was so 
decisive, what role was left to the gerontes? There is only a slight possibility that 
the istor was at hand to remember and remind the audience if the blood-mo-
ney was accepted before in comparable cases.86 He might have reported how 
and that violent blood-feud was replaced by blood-money (poinē) in one or 
more concrete situations or perhaps to adduce his remembrance and offer his 
information on some other important issue at stake. Blood-price seems most 
unlikely to have replaced blood-feud as standard usage all at once, always and 
in all situations in the same way. How it did so, almost certainly depended on 
particular characteristics of a concrete case of homicide. Only in that sense 
could an istor “end” (peirar) the preliminary dilemma of whether blood-money 
was previously acceptable in comparable circumstances. In any case he did not 
decide between parties. Such a presumption about the role of the istor is quite 
unsustainable as the whole hypothesis that a legal matter was subject of the 
Homeric trial scene is not very probable. The very presence of the istor when 
and where he is mentioned and unconvincing explanation of his role vitiate 
that theory.
If the issue was the one of facts, namely whether blood-money was correctly 
disbursed or, what sounds more plausible, if it was paid at all, makes the case 
more open for dispute and the role of istor could be more easily explained. The 
responsibility of the istor would have been quite similar to that of the pristav 
in the customs of early medieval Slavs or to the function of the dorzon among 
Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija. The istor did not rule on liability, since 
the case had already been solved by a compromise during his presence. He 
only informed the gerontes about what he knew (as a person of public trust), 
86 M.	Gagarin, op. cit. (fn.	60),	68	is	right	that	there	is	no	evidence	that	mnāmones in	
Gortyn	remembered	the	outcomes	of	earlier	cases	as	precedents	or	rules	 for	new	
cases.	But	argumentum ex silentio	does	not	mean	that	something	similar	did	not	take	
place,	particularly	 if	one	 takes	 into	 consideration	 the	 role	of	pristav	 in	Medieval	
Slavic	law.
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about something that he was supposed to supervise and as a guarantee/guaran-
tor of the fulfillment of an agreed obligation. He was present in the Homeric 
trial scene to report what could have been a defect in executing the blood-feud 
compromise, as he was one-who-knows. This is why the gerontes speak in turn 
about different possibilities after his statement. The sequence of verses clearly 
points to this.
In any event the function of the istor was not to decide the case but to re-
port about some relevant issues. His declaration could be related to the history 
of the actual clash (about the content of the decision, about the details and 
manner of its enforcement, or something else pertinent). However, it is not 
impossible that the istor was also invited to mention other cases that he had 
observed before.87 The istor’s statement could affect the final verdict and this 
is why the parties and the audience were so excited to hear what he was going 
to say. However, the final decision on how to solve the concrete dispute, de-
pending on specific elements of the case, was in the hands of the gerontes only. 
Many societies without written judicial procedure have used persons of pu-
blic trust in a similar role of “rememberer”, of him “who knows” facts relevant 
to the process. This may well be a point of the phrase epi istori – to stand before 
him to learn or to be reminded of facts. What he had seen and remembered 
was basically a non-written archive of the case. Therefore, the istor was an 
important person who was present during the process, a man of public trust 
whose knowledge could be decisive, but he himself was not a decision maker. 
Consequently MacDowell’s translation sounds quite tolerable, albeit only 
in its first part: “both wished to obtain trial at the hands of istor”. MacDowell 
is among the rare English-speaking authors who have avoided asserting that 
parties wanted to obtain from the istor decision, verdict, judgement or somet-
hing else very binding. The only problem with MacDowell’s approach is that 
he translated istor as a judge, merging the role of gerontes and istor (as many 
other scholars have done as well). However, Homer clearly says that the elders’ 
action was dikazein, while to istor is only ascribed peirar helesthai. It was they 
who gave the judgement based upon the facts of each specific case, taking the 
istor’s statement into careful consideration. His role in a preliterate society was 
surely very important. He was a “walking archive of judiciary”, whose report 
could strongly affect the final decision by the elders, but he himself was not a 
person authorized to come to a decision. 
87 Previous decisions were taken into account when the plechnija were ruling, H, Isma-
ili, op. cit. (fn. 74), 152.
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Let us end with a suggestion for future English translators. The best soluti-
on for translating istor in the Iliad’s trial scene at the shield of Achilles should 
be to avoid either “judge” or “arbiter” or “witness”. Having in mind comparati-
ve data surveyed in this paper, particularly the role of dorzon among Albanians, 
I maintain that a rather more accurate term would be “warranty”, or “guaran-
tee,” like pristav in old Slavic law, or “guarantor,” like Agamemnon upon his 
comrades’ argument during the chariot race in Iliad Book 23 (in Thür’s con-
vincing interpretation). Of course, the easiest solution for translators would be 
to keep the original Greek word istor, just as mnāmōn in the Code of Gortyn 
is never translated by any modern-language alternative. “One-who-knows”, as 
suggested by Hammond (although probably with different connotations in 
his view), and “Wissender” in Thür’s German, might be also a good choice to 
translate Homeric istor, since it would better fit his probable role in the judicial 
process. Modern legal terminology cannot offer a better single-word-for-single-
word translation for Homeric istor. In any case, it would be wrong to make 
istor anachronistically into a technical term, designating a kind of officer of 
the community, instead of a person of public trust who was present at some 
important occasions as a warranty and gives his statement on what he knows 
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Sažetak
Prof. dr. sc. Sima Avramović *
KRVNINA KOD HOMERA – ULOGA ISTORA U SCENI SUĐENJA 
NA AHILOVOM ŠTITU (Il. 18, 497-508)
Autor analizira čuvene kontroverzne stihove iz homerove Ilijade (18, 497-508) u 
kojima se opisuje scena suđenja u vezi sa ubistvom. Ukazuje na mnoga sporna mesta 
i različita tumačenja nekoliko pitanja. Prvo je šta je predmet spora – je li po sredi 
faktičko pitanje (da li je krvnina za ubistvo plaćena ili ne) ili pravno (da li se krvnina 
može zameniti kompenzacijom). Drugo se odnosi na dilemu da li su stranke dragovoljno 
iznele svoj spor pred arbitra da bi se izbegla samopomoć ili postupak vodi društvo u cilju 
suzbijanja samopomoći. Treće nejasno pitanje je ko donosi odluku u sporu – okupljeni 
narod svojim nadvikivanjem, skupina geronata ili pojedinac - istor? U vezi sa time je i 
pitanje kome se po završetku spora dodeljuje 12 talenata u zlatu koje pominje homer. 
Autor sugerira da istor nije ni sudija niti arbitar, već osoba javne vere i poredi ga sa 
mnamonom u Gortinskom zakoniku iz V veka pre n.e. sa Krita, koji je tamo neka 
vrsta sudskog pomoćnika čiji je zadatak da, u vreme kada pismenost još nije dovoljno 
razvijena, pamti sadržinu sudskih odluka (etimološki: onaj koji se seća). Uporedo sa 
tim, autor ukazuje i na moguću sličnost sa funkcijom pristava u starom srednjevekovnom 
južnoslovenskom pravu, koji je bio pomoćnik sudijama, prisustvovao raznim pravnim 
poslovima za čije je izvršenje garantovao i čijim se izjavama poklanjala javna vera (osobe 
javne vere). Osim toga, autor traži pravno-antropološku paralelu pomenute homerske 
scene sa običajnim sudom staraca - plećnije koja se dugo zadržala kod Albanaca na 
Kosovu i metohiji i sa ulogom koju je imao dorzon, kao osoba koja je garantovala da će 
se stranke pridržavati mišljenja plećnara. Na osnovu svega toga zaključuje da homerski 
istor nije bio ni sudija niti arbitar, već osoba javne vere, koja je bila prisutna i koja zna 
važne činjenice u vezi sa spornom krvninom.
Ključne reči: ubistvo, krvnina, samopomoć, arbitraža, Gortinski zakonik
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